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ABSTRACT
The paper presents an evaluation of the urban homesteading
model as a policy tool for affordable housing. The City of
Boston's urban homesteading program serves as a starting
point to examine urban homesteading and what program
elements are necessary to make homesteading work.
Boston's homesteading program operates with a very
limited self-help element. The majority of sweat equity is
carried out by contractors rather than the homesteaders
themeselves. However, true homesteading means self-help;
the homesteaders rehabilitate the houses themselves. Self-
help homesteading offers other benefits which make it an
important alternative for low to moderate income housing.
These special qualities are autonomy in housing choice and
economy in homeownership. Therefore, by cutting sweat
equity to a minimum, Boston loses the important aspects of
autonomy and economy.
Boston's program directors claim that true self-help
homesteading is impossible and the only way homesteading can
work is through reducing sweat equity to a minimum.
However, SWAP, a homesteading program in Providence, has
operated successfully with true sweat equity program for 10
years, turning out over 400 homesteading properties.
The paper looks at why SWAP succeeded where Boston
failed in implementing a true self-help homesteading
program. Homesteading programs have four elements:
administration, financing, homesteader selection and sweat
equity/rehabilitation. An investigation of the two
homesteading programs in terms of these four elements reveal
what is necessary to make homesteading a feasible provider
for affordable housing.
As a result of the analysis, small, non-profit
grassroots organizations have more success in doing sweat
equity homesteading than does a city bureaucracy. The
grassroots group can set up the necessary technical and
emotional support system to allow homesteaders to perform
all of the work themselves. However, the city must
generously fund the non-profit to keep homesteading
affordable to low to moderate income people.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Philip L. Clay
Title: Associate Professor of City Planning
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Owning a home: the American dream. After the hardship
of World War II, Americans revelled in the economy's burst
of energy and their own new-found buying power. Caught up
in the consumer spirit, people purchased new cars, new
clothes, new appliances. As Americans accumulated more and
more possesions, they needed a new place and more room for
their new things. The search led scores of people to the
suburbs. Housing construction boomed. Banks did a brisk
business in the mortgage lending department. Soon many
people, even average working Americans, lived in their own
home. Buying a house meant the owner had "arrived," and
everyone believed firmly in the right to a chance at this
step towards success.
The American housing market has since undergone great
changes. Market weaknesses, demographic shifts and the
great population explosion resulting from the children
produced in all of those post-war new houses have stretched
America's housing supply to its limit. Economic pressures
sent mortgage rates to impossible heights, as well as
contributing to a rise in real estate values. The baby boom
generation, with its size and changing household patterns,
increased pressure on the amount of housing demanded. The
friction of these growths and pressures has greatly
constrained the housing market which now fails to produce
sufficient housing for Americans. This failure becomes
especially apparent as many Americans try to purchase homes
and find that today few but the wealthy hold the dream of
2homeownership within their reach.
The lack of availability and affordability has not
changed the value Americans place on buying a house.
Americans still regard the ability to provide people with
the opportunity to own their own home as a measure of the
sucess of the nation's housing system. Therefore, for
planners and housing policy makers, it becomes an important
issue to generate opportunities for homeownership to those
who otherwise could not afford the option.
One solution to this dilemma gows out of the same
"American spirit" which so highly values individual,
independent ownership. Early American pioneers developed
the West by getting land free from the government. If they
worked the land and lived there for a certain number of
years, they received the title to the land. Homesteaders,
as they came to be called, earned the ownership rights to
their property in return for their sweat and endurance.
These pioneers have recently reappeared in a somewhat
different context. Modern homesteaders live in the inner
city. Their prairies are declining urban neighborhoods,
their properties abandoned or dilapidated buildings. Urban
homesteaders obtain buildings from the city for a nominal
fee or a reduced rate, rehabilitate them with their own
sweat, live in them for a certain number of years, and
assume ownership of the property. The risks taken by the
homesteaders in tackling such projects in the modern urban
wilderness are rewarded by the chance to own their own home
at a reduced cost.
3Homesteading first surfaced in an urban setting during
the latter part of the 1960's. Citizen groups in many
cities began rehabilitating abandoned buildings on a very
small scale. One of the first organized efforts came in
1968, when Philadelphia created a housing program called
"urban homesteading." They modeled it after the original
Homestead Act of pioneer days. It called for giving
abandoned homes to people who would in turn repair, maintain
and reside in the homes. Unfortunately, the program
languished unimplemented on the desks of the housing office.
Several years later, Wilmington, Delaware picked up the
idea. In 1973, Wilmington became the first municipality to
officially adopt a homesteading ordinance. The City of
Balitmore followed Delaware with a similar program. By the
latter part of 1973, Philadelphia managed to finally
implement its program with a homesteading ordinance.(1)
Soon after, other cities began exploring the idea.
In 1975, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development followed these precedents and developed urban
homesteading into a national program called the Urban
Homesteading Demonstration. Under Section 810 of the
Housing and Community Development Act passed by Congress in
1974, HUD repossessed vacant or abandoned one- to four-unit
properties throughout the country for use in its Urban
Homesteading Demonstration. Cities could join the
Demonstration, take over the HUD properties and in turn give
them to homesteaders for rehabilitation and eventual sale.
By 1977, thirty-nine cities had joined the program.(2)
4Among the earlier cities to participate, the City of
Boston applied to the Urban Homesteading Demonstration in
September of 1975. The City was interested in improving its
declining neighborhoods and in providing affordable
homeownership opportunities for residents of these
neighborhoods.
In 1970, the majority of Boston's population lived in
homes they owned themselves. In fact, twice as many people
owned their dwelling unit than rented their unit. In
contrast to the city-wide population, however, blacks
primarily rented their dwellings. Owner-occupied dwellings
were only a quarter of the number of renter-occupied
dwellings. For Hispanics, the picture was worse, with
owner-occupied dwellings only one tenth of the number of the
renter-occupied units.(3) Blacks and Hispanics, being
groups with traditionally lower income than the overall
population, were clearly at a deficit in the field of
homeownership. A policy to create affordable homeownership
opportunities had to be found.
In the eyes of City officials in the mid-1970's, the
Urban Homesteading program offered a means to this end. Now
that the program has been in operation for eight years and
has turned out over 175 properties, many, both within and
outside the program, feel that Boston successfully achieved
what it set out to with the homesteading program.
This paper looks at this "success" and uses it as a
vehicle to explore the notion of homesteading. Did the City
of Boston in fact achieve the goals it set out for itself?
5If the Boston program does qualify as "successful", what
made it such? And most importantly, what are the
implications of such a program in terms of homesteading as a
tool for affordable homeownership?
Boston viewed urban homesteading as one alternative for
providing affordable homeownership. In the homesteading
program's initial proposal to HUD, the program required that
homesteaders earn low to moderate incomes. (Low to moderate
income guidelines are determined by HUD standards of 80% of
the area's median income.) Therefore, if the program served
its targeted population, this low-to-moderate income group,
then Boston can claim success with its homesteading
endeavor.
However, the importance of the success of the
homesteading program go beyond the simple fact that the
homesteading program provided homeownership opportunities to
low to moderate income people. What within the program
structure enabled Boston to serve lower income residents in
this mannner? And what policy implications do these keys to
success bring to homesteading?
To answer these questions, it is first necessary to
define homesteading. Simply, homesteading entails a
prospective owner obtaining a dilapidated, abandoned house
for minimal cost, renovating it by himself, and receiving
the title to the property. Homesteading program staff carry
out many of the preparatory tasks enabling the homesteader
to purchase the building and perform the rehabilitation such
as: selecting suitable homesteading properties from the
6available abandoned stock, assessing the property for
rehabilitation needs and assisting in locating mortgage
financing for the homesteader. The homesteader proceeds on
his own with the rehabiliation of the house. Signing on as
a homesteader means agreeing to complete the specified
rehabilitation work within a required time limit and to live
in the property for a certain number of years.
The key to homesteading is the part of the process in
which the homesteader carries out the rehabilitation of the
property himself. This self-help aspect of the program is
called sweat equity. Sweat equity or self-help means the
owner of the property performs most of the labor in
restoring the house to liveable condition. The includes all
stages of repair: demolition, debris removal, carpentry,
painting, cabinet making and more. The homesteader decides
what the house will look like and he fulfills the plans with
his own hands.
The nature of homesteading, as it first was envisioned
by early Americans, entailed working for the right to the
property. If pioneers were willing to pour their sweat into
the land for three years, they earned the right to keep it.
In a pure model of homesteading, the right to ownership must
be earned by laboring for that right. Therefore, true
homesteading means true sweat equity. Restoring the
property through self-help gives the homesteader the right
to the property.
However, the importance of sweat equity to the concept
of homesteading goes beyond historical precedent. It
7separates homesteading from other housing subsidy programs
and makes homesteading a unique and important alternative
for provision of affordable homeownership opportunities.
Low to moderate income people seldom have the
opportunity to enter the mainstream housing market.
Restricted by income and other social factors, they lack the
opportunity to make choices about their housing. They are
forced to accept whatever limited affordable housing becomes
available to them, regardless of housing type, quality,
style, location. The sweat equity component of a
homesteading program gives the homesteader the independence
to shape his housing, make choices. In rebuilding a home to
his own specifications, a homesteader puts personal stock in
the project which other types of predetermined housing
programs cannot give.
Homesteading through sweat equity can lower the costs
of renovation to the homesteader. He does the work himself
and thus saves the costs of hiring a contractor. He buys
the materials himself and does not pay extra through a
middle man. And finally, the independence allowed by a true
sweat equity program gives the homesteader the option on the
types and expense of the renovation work. If planners or
program staff make all of the decisions about the type and
the amount of rehabilitation, the homesteader must pay for
that rehabilitation. He must pay for the diswasher, the oak
floor boards, the cabinets, even if he might not want them.
With a self-help program, homesteaders can do as much or as
little as they desire and they can save money be performing
8the work themselves.
This is not to say that programs which produce housing
for low to moderate income families without sweat equity are
not useful in the housing system. Programs which produce
affordable units have merit if they are reasonably cost-
effective. However, I am arguing that a homesteading
program must have true sweat equity component, where the
homesteader actually carries out the majority of the
rehabilitation himself, if it is to follow a pure
homesteading model.
But why bother with pure homesteading at all, if other
subsidy programs provide affordable housing? The reason is
that homesteading provides a means for affordable housing
which also offers something more. Homesteading in its pure
form with a true sweat equity requirement adds to the
opportunity for affordable housing the elements of
independence and economy. Self-help makes homesteading a
unique and workable alternative for affordable housing
provision.
Homesteading programs involve various factors in their
operation: administrative organization, homesteader
selection, financing, sweat equity/rehabiliation. Each of
these components contributes to the program's outcome.
In the case of Boston, the core of the success of
Boston's program in serving a low to moderate income
population seems to lie in the the program's redefinition
of the sweat equity or "self-help" portion. At the
program's inception, the City of Boston required most of the
9renovation to be accomplished through sweat equity by the
homesteader. Over the course of the homesteading program,
the requirements for sweat equity dropped from this heavy
work requirement to simple light cosmetic work. Once the
program shifted to a light sweat equity component, outside
contractors completed the rehabilitation under direction of
the staff of the homesteading office. The homesteaders
moved into the almost-finished product.
This change occured because the administrators of the
program found it necessary for the successful completion of
homesteading projects to reduce the sweat equity component
to a minimum. They felt the only way for the homesteading
program to turn out finished products was to take away the
burden of rehabiltation from the homesteader and turn it
over to contractors.
While this change in the program may have precipitated
a happy resolution to the housing crisis of a group of
people, I believe it is problematic to a pure homesteading
model. As I discussed before, a true sweat equity component
is central to the homesteading model. Therefore, watering
it down to simple cosmetic repair takes away the core of the
homesteading ideal. Completing the renovation before the
homesteader moves in takes away his choice about his housing
and his independence. The homesteading program then becomes
no different from other forms of subsidized housing by
losing the bonuses of autonomy and economy, qualities which
make homesteading unique and important in the scheme of
affordable housing.
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To explore the importance of self-help in
homesteading, I look first at the national urban
homesteading model. This provides a theoretical framework
within which to examine the operational aspects of a
homesteading program. I have chosen the City of Boston as a
springboard for this more specific investigation. I do not
intend this paper as a detailed evaluation of Boston's Urban
Homesteading program. Conducting such an evaluation would
be a very difficult task owing to the lack of cooperation of
the Homesteading office staff as well as the difficulty in
uncovering data from organizations now disbanded or
reorganized. However, by studying two non-profit
organizations' activities as participators in the
homesteading program, I can investigate the population
served by the homesteading program, and determine how
effective the program was in that service.
I plan to do this by examining the homesteader data
obtained from the non-profit groups, and using that data to
evaluate the program's operation. To further understand the
Boston experience in the homesteading venture, I found it
useful to compare it with another homesteading program, one
which in contrast to Boston, manages to run a program
including a heavy sweat equity requirement. Stop Wasting
Abandoned Properties (SWAP), in Providence, Rhode Island, is
a private, non-profit urban homesteading program. They
provide homeownership for low-to-moderate income families
through homesteading. SWAP families carry out almost all of
the sweat equity themselves.
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If the SWAP program succeeded where Boston failed, in
working a true sweat equity requirement, how did it manage
to do this? Was it necessary to cut other parts of the
program? The answers to these questions provide a way of
to understand homesteading and to see what would be required
to use it in its pure form as a tool of affordable housing
policy.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE HOMESTEADING MODEL
In 1974, Congress passed the Housing and Community
Development Act, authorizing HUD to initiate a homesteading
program.(4) HUD designed the Section 810 Urban Homesteading
Demonstration, which called for a cooperative arrangement
between HUD and local city governments.(5) Congress passed
the "National Homestead Act of 1974" on February 28. The
Act called on HUD to establish a national homesteading
program to transfer dwellings at nominal cost to people who
would rehabilitate and then occupy them. It claimed:
It is the purpose of this Act to assist in
alleviating the present shortage of decent
housing for low-and moderate-income individuals
and families through the more constructive use
of federally owned residential property,
while at the same time assisting in the
elimination of deterioration and blight in
urban and other areas and in the effective
rehabilitation of those areas.(6)
The Homestead Act further detailed program criteria. The
federal government had a stockpile properties it obtained
due to foreclosure. It would transfer properties to local
housing agencies, who would in turn convey these properties
to homesteaders under certain conditions. The Act specified
that the homesteader had to occupy the property for a
minimum of five years. It also declared that the
homesteader himself was to rehabilitate the property as much
as necessary to bring it up to housing code standards, and
had to permit periodic inspections by the housing agency.
The potential homesteader had to have the financial
capability to carry the costs of rehabiliation. Those who
qualified as low-to moderate-income were to be given
13
preference whenever possible. At the end of five years, the
homesteader would receive the title to the entire
property.(7)
The program design put together by HUD followed these
criteria. However, in the catalog it put out on the urban
homesteading program, HUD did not present a single model for
the cities to follow. Rather, it left the guidelines
flexible to encompass the diverse nature of cities involved
and the wide range of possibilities within a homesteading
program.
The elements in designing a homesteading program
involve neighborhood selection, property selection,
homesteader selection, rehabilation process and funding, and
permanant financing. The Homesteading Catalog presents
these elements in the chart on the following page.
HUD makes a distinction here between "needy"
homesteaders and "capable" homesteaders. This raises an
important issue. Both of these program types provide
homeownership opportunities. But they do not both represent
ways of providing homeownership to those who could not
otherwise participate in the market.
A program designed to target "capable" homesteaders
seeks to improve the tenor of the neighborhood, to bring in
people with higher incomes to pull up a declining
neighborhood population. Unfortunately, the influx of
relatively wealthier residents wanting to take advantage
of cheaper housing opportunities takes away the opportunity
14
Homeownership
for "needy"
homesteaders
HUD Guidelines
(From the Homesteading Catalog)
Homesteader Property Plan for
Selection Selection Rehabilation
*Lower Income *Number of *Encourage
families properties self-help;
should be minimize
*Capable of maximized use of
self-help to contractors
offset rehab *Properties
costs should have
low rehab
costs
Financing
Repairs
*Aid home-
steaders
to obtain
necessary
financing
*Minimum *Subsidize
standards of cost of
rehab finance
*Provide
technical
assistance
Stable, capable
homesteaders
demonstrating
"capacity"
*Stable
households
clearly able
to bear the
costs of
homesteading
*Select *Impose high
groups of rehab
properties standards
to impact
most on *Minimize
neighborhood self-help
to insure
quality;
use
contractors
and moniter
to enforce
rehab
standards
*Encourage
homesteader
to obtain
private
financing
*Seek
private
lender
commitment
to the
provision
of credit
to owners
(8)
for lower income local residents who have more need for
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lower cost housing. In effect, this is indirect
displacement. Since most of the homesteading properties are
vacant, low income people are not actually displaced.
However, they are displaced from the opportunity to buy a
house at an affordable rate. Further, it is probable that
"capable" homesteaders have the financial means to obtain
housing in the regular market. In this case, an urban
homesteading program serves as a low cost lure to bring
wealthy residents back into declining neighborhoods.
There is nothing wrong with this philosophy if that is
the city's goal. However, it is problematic when it
comes to the concept of urban homesteading. "Capable"
homesteading includes a minimization of self-help. The bulk
of the work done is completed by contractors, not the
homesteader him or herself. As I argued in the introduction
of the paper, this seems contrary to the pure theory of
homesteading, which calls for the homesteader to perform the
labor independently. Therefore, this type of a homesteading
program, serving those more financially and socially capable
than the existing neighborhood residents, is not
homesteading at all, but systematic subsidized removal of
affordable housing opportunity for low income residents.
In this paper, I consider the truer form of
homesteading: the "needy" homesteader program, one which
calls for minimizing the use of contractors and encouraging
self-help. Whether this type of urban homesteading can
work without compromising the self-help portion is the
critical question I will explore. As well, I will examine
16
the elements needed to make this type of homesteading a
viable program.
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CHAPTER THREE: URBAN HOMESTEADING--BOSTON
PROGRAM DESIGN
In its proposal to HUD to join the Urban Homesteading
demonstration, the City of Boston drew a mixture of elements
into its scheme:
The goal of the program is to use
this rehabilitation program to
arrest deterioration, restore
abandonned housing to active life,
and infuse new strentgh into
neighborhood housing suffering
from some form of disinvestment.(9)
The process Boston outlined to carry out these goals
followed very closely that suggested in the Urban
Homesteading Act of 1974. First, HUD would present the list
of available properties to the Homesteading Office of the
City. The Homesteading Office staff and the neighborhood
non-profits would review the list together and select
properties. HUD would then convey the properties to the
Homesteading Office, who then them to the non-profit. The
non-profits would take it from there, marketing the property
and selecting the participating homesteaders. The non-
profit would put together a financial package for the
homesteader, who would buy the property for only the cost of
rehabilitation. Finally, the homesteader would actually
purchase the property from the non-profit. The requirements
called for the homesteader to perform the required
rehabilitation and reside in the house for three years,
whereupon the title to the property would be transfered to
the homesteader.(10)
The homesteading program staff selected the
18
homesteaders based on several criteria. Mainly, it
depended on "the applicant's ability to financially support
the burden of homeownership and perform physical
rehabilitation."(11) However, the proposal stated that all
homesteaders accepted into the program had to come within
either the HUD guidelines for low- to moderate income (70%
of the area's median income), or earn a maximum household
income of $30,000. The non-profit could choose either
option as its income guideline.(12) Since it limited
homesteader income to low to moderate standards, the Boston
program took on the appearance of the first of HUD's two
categories, the "needy" homesteaders program.
The non-profit staff's decision about the potential
homesteader's ability to afford the project was based on the
"rule of thumb" that housing cost (mortgage, taxes,
utilities) should not exceed 35% of household income. At
the same time, the homesteader could not have outstanding
liabilities (car, furniture, credit cards) exceeding 15% of
household income. Exceptions to this could be made on a
case-by-case basis. The amount of cash the potential
homesteader had to come up with was 20% of the loan amount
for the rehabilitation costs, in addition to monthly
payments to maintain the property.
The other major criterion was the willingness on the
part of the homesteader to make a personal commitment to
sweat equity. As in the HUD model for "needy" homesteaders,
the requirements in the beginning stage of the program
called for the work to be done by the homesteader.
19
Selection put emphasis on those with a trade skill which
could be used in heavy sweat equity, or a willingness to
learn a trade skill. Also, the staff would look at the
applicant's willingness to perform cosmetic repair such as
painting, scraping and wallpapering. Finally, the non-
profit would closely supervise the work.(13)
Two other criteria came into the selection process.
Those with "housing need" were given preference. First
came "needy" families, or those living in overcrowded or
substandard housing as defined by City housing code
standards. Secondly, those evicted from present housing by
governmental action received consideration. Families with
more than one child were third in priority. In addition,
the program gave preference to those already living in the
neighborhood.(14)
PROGRAM HISTORY
The City of Boston began its Urban Homesteading program
in 1975. It placed central control of the program in the
city agency responsible for community development. This
agency, the Neighborhood Development and Employment Agency,
created an Urban Homesteading Office in its Housing
Division. The office was headed by Director Frank Tate and
was staffed by an assistant director and several housing and
rehabiliation specialists.
Once the office was created, the Boston Urban
Homesteading Program suffered through a slow start-up
period. The Homesteading office filed its application to
HUD in September of 1975. HUD approved Boston's
20
participation in the program in February of 1976.
Implementation of the program took place in stages, with the
bulk of the properties not coming on line until 1977.
The first non-profit organization to begin homesteading
properties under the City homesteading program, in June of
1976, was Urban Edge. Urban Edge, a low income housing
development corporation, based its operation in Jamaica
Plain. Unlike the other non-profit groups participating in
homesteading, Urban Edge had its own revolving loan fund.
It did not, therefore, contract its services on a daily
basis to the central homesteading office. Instead, Urban
Edge received HUD properties through the homesteading
office, figured out a per-unit cost for rehabilitation, and
then obtained a grant from the central office for completion
of the project. Urban Edge secured permanent financing for
its homesteaders directly from a bank, rather than through
the central homesteading office. (15)
The other two non-profits who participated at the start
of the homesteading program joined early in 1977. These
organizations, Community Training Dynamics and Ronan
Neighborhood Associates, contracted out their services to
the central office on a daily basis. The purchase
agreements signed by the homesteaders called for three-year
residence and a sweat-equity completion date of one year.
Financing for the rehabilitation work came in the form of
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgages. (16)
The program experienced difficulties during these early
years. When the homesteading program first started, it had
21
no pool of funds to serve as loan collateral and the FHA
loans proved very difficult to obtain. Without such a
backup fund, the FHA would not approve mortgage loans for
homesteaders to rehabilitate the properties. The risk on
homesteading projects without security seemed too great.
To compensate for this problem, in 1978, the City began
to subsidize the financing and the rehabilitation costs with
Community Development Block Grant money. With CDBG monies,
the homesteading program created a fund to remain untouched
in the bank. The fund served as collateral and secured the
mortgage loans from the theoretical risk that the property
would not be sold. Once it created this backup fund, the
program stopped using FHA loans altogether and switched to
using conventional mortgages available at local banks. They
choose MHFA loans, or whichever area bank provided the best
mortgage buy at the time of the loan.(17) On more recent
properties, the majority have used MHFA loans. The MHFA
loans proved helpful to production of homesteading
properties as they made rehabilitation money more accessible
at better interest rates to homesteaders.
At the same time, the program picked up its fourth non-
profit, Lena Park Community Develoment Corporation. They
participated for four years and then dropped out of the
program. They had attempted to set up a revolving loan fund
like that of Urban Edge and failed. In the meantime, Ronan
Neighborhood Associates had only produced a minimum of
activity under the homesteading program and Community
Training Dynamics was going out of existence. To keep
22
going, the program needed new blood.
By 1981, the last three organizations joined the
homesteading program: Roxbury Multi-Service Center,
Dorchester Bay Economic Development Corporation and East
Boston Community Development Corporation. These final three
groups, in addition to Urban Edge, are the only groups still
participating.(18)
As new non-profit organizations joined, the
homesteading program underwent other changes. By 1981, the
number of available HUD properties in Boston had dwindled,
owing to sale of the buildings by HUD and rehabilitation of
the buildings by homesteading and other programs. The
program then switched from HUD properties to City owned
properties which were being foreclosed by the City due to
tax delinquency. The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA)
held title to those City-owned foreclosed properties. The
Homesteading Office decided which properties might be
appropriate for homesteading and took the property title
over from the BRA.
Also, the program was finding it very difficult to get
homesteaders interested in doing heavy sweat equity work.
Frank Tate attributed this lack of interest in self-help to
the type of housing. Boston's housing stock is
characterized by large wood frame structures. Tate claimed
the size and style of the houses made sweat equity very
difficult. While the size of the houses make renovation a
challenging task, I do not agree with Tate that it makes it
impossible. As I will show later in this paper,
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homesteaders in Providence rehabilitated properties similar
in size and structure. It is not clear why the directors of
Boston's program felt it mattered in Boston while it
apparently did not in Providence.
In any case, the directors of the Boston program
decided the rehabilitation task was too onorous for the
homesteaders to undertake themselves and that the
homesteaders had no desire to partake in that aspect of the
program. In response to this, program directors reduced the
requirements to simple cosmetic work such as painting,
papering, and cleaning. The rest of the renovation was
completed by contractors. The homesteaders moved in only
after the contractors finished their task.
The directors of the program also saw the lack of
enthusiasm for the rehabilitation work as causing the work
to drag in completion. Therefore, to force earlier
completion of the rehabilitation work, the program dropped
the completion requirement period from one year down to six
months and soon thereafter to three or four months.(19)
This might seem a very short time to complete the sweat
equity work. However, as the requirements only called for
interior painting, sanding and other cosmetic touches, three
months should be sufficient.
The initial homesteading properties did drag in
completion. However, I disagree with Tate that it was
simply the lack of enthusiasm for sweat equity that caused
the delays. Certainly the job of renovating a large frame
home is an arduous one. It can only be accomplished with
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sufficient support for the homesteaders from the program
staff. Boston expected the homesteaders to repair the homes
themselves, yet it failed to create a system of emotional
and technical support to aid the homesteader. The
Providence program used just such a support system which
enabled the homesteaders to complete the same task that
Boston homesteaders, left on their own, could not.
To deal with the problems of size of structure, the
Homesteading Office made another change in the homesteading
program. It began to rehabilitate multi-family units for
division and sale as condominiums. Rehabilitation and hence
the sweat equity required for a condo unit was considerably
less than for a whole house. The units could go on the
market much sooner and one building could provide ownership
opportunities to more people. On recent condominums, the
sweat equity requirement called for 2 month completion.(20)
In addition, the costs of rehabilitating a 3-family house,
especially the large size wood frame homes most prevalent in
Boston, were rapidly growing out of the reach of low-
moderate income standards. In the eyes of the homesteading
program, the condominiums allowed a more affordable
alternative.
As the requirements on sweat equity completion changed,
so did the length of time required of the homesteader to
reside in the house. Until 1983, the homesteader had to
live in the house for three years after he or she signed the
purchase agreement, whereupon she or he received clear title
to the property. During 1983, the program raised the
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residency requirement to the full five years (as outlined in
the original Homesteading Act of 1974). More recently, the
homesteading program has raised this minimum to a 10 year
occupancy requirement, but there has not been time for
properties to be implemented under this. (21) Program staff
has not specified why these changes took place. Certainly,
a longer residency requirement increases the homesteader's
personal investment in the property. It also discourages
the homesteader from living in the house for several years
and then turning around to sell at a huge profit to a family
which is not low to moderate income.
The latter four non-profit organizations now constitute
the whole of the homesteading program. The earlier groups
have either gone out of business all together or simply
ceased participation in the program. Locating information
on homesteaders participating under the earlier stages of
the homesteading venture is a difficult task. The records
at the City's Homesteading Office are inaccessible and
incomplete, according to director Frank Tate. Community
Training Dynamics is no longer in existence. Ronan
Neighborhood Associates kept very poor records and nobody
connected with the homesteading portion of their operation
works there any longer. Thus, those records are virtually
unattainable as well. Urban Edge has been with the program
since its inception. Unfortunately, they only keep at hand
information for the last two years and the central
homesteading office does not have any of the older records
readily available.(22)
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For purposes of locating information with which to
evaluate the homesteading program, that leaves the three
most recent groups: Dorchester Bay EDC, Roxbury Multi-
Service Center, East Boston CDC. East Boston has recently
slowed homesteading projects considerably due to the
unavailability of abandoned or repossessed properties.
Therefore, the most likely candidates for study are
Dorchester Bay and Roxbury. Each of these groups has turned
out approximately ten properties under the Urban
Homesteading Program. The files on each of the properties
are not entirely complete and the sample size is limited,
but enough information exists to allow some conclusions
about the population served by homesteading.
In the initial application to HUD and in a statement of
goals by the director of the homesteading program, the
homesteading program was to strengthen the housing situation
in neighborhoods suffering from disinvestment.(23) In the
eyes of the Boston Urban Homesteading program, this meant
providing homeownership opportunities to lower income
residents who could not otherwise buy a house on their
own.(24) If the homesteading program did actually provide
homeownership opportunities to low to moderate income
people, then it can be considered successful.
The data on homesteaders in Dorchester and Roxbury
shows that generally the homesteading program has met these
criteria. First, I will discuss the properties completed by
Dorchester Bay EDC , then those worked on by Roxbury Multi-
Service Center. After I look at the characteristics of the
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homesteaders served in each case, I will examine the
different aspects of the program: administrative
organization, homesteader selection, financing and sweat
equity/rehabilitation for both Dorchester Bay and Roxbury
Multi-Service.
CASE 1: DORCHESTER BAY EDC
PROGRAM SERVICE
The following tables give basic information on each of
the homesteading properties completed by Dorchester Bay EDC.
Table 1A details property information, Table 1B shows
homesteader characteristics. The information is listed in
order of date of purchase of the property by the
homesteader. The first properties were purchased in 1982.
The tables have some missing information due to
incompleteness of homesteading data files. Also, the last
four properties listed had not been closed on at the date on
my inquiry.
It is fairly clear from the data that the homesteaders
in this part of the program have incomes low enough to show
that the program serves low to moderate income residents.
The lowest is $10,000 for a family of six, a figure
obviously at the very low end of the income scale and well
within the HUD requirement of $29,000 for a family of
six.(25) They certainly could not purchase a home in the
area ( which cost anywhere from $80,000 up) on their own.
With a family of six, renting an apartment is close to
impossible as well. Large apartments are scarce. If such
TABLE 1A
Property Characteristics: Oorchester
Sweat Equity/
Rehab
Mortgage Residency
Reqirement
2 1
3 1
4 1
5!I
61
91
10!
11ll
30 years, 13.5% I 3
Conventional I
30 years, 13.7% 1 3
Conventional 1
30 years, 13.5% 1 3
Conventional I
details not giveni 3
details not given 5
20 years, 11.75% I 5
MHFA I
details not giveni 5
details not given! 5
details not given 5
details not given! 51
details not given! 5
Cq*
TABLE 18
Homesteader Characteristics: Dorchester
Sex Age Race Marital #
Status Child
Previous
Address
Income Occupation
Dorchester
3 years
Dorchester
3 years
Dorchester
Dorchester
20/9 years
Dorchester
10 years
Roxbury
Roxbury
3 years
Dorchester
2 years
Dorchester
Dorchester
e months
Roxbury
$17,000
$21,000
$16,500
$17,599
$15,600
$13,500
$17,472
$10,000
$13, 6??
$9,216
$6,400
$10,000
$7,500
$2,000
Meatpacker
Postal Clerk
Restaurant Manager
Secretary
Teacher
Not working
Bus Operator
Not working
Solderer
Not working
Engineering Aid
Waiter
Substitute Teacher
Bus Driver
Building
Type
Sales
Price
Cleanpaperpaint
3 months
Cleanpaper,paint
3 months
Clean, paper, paint
3 months
Clean,paper.paint
3 months
Clean,paperpaint
3 months
Cleanpaperpaint
3 months
Clean,paperpaint
3 months
Cleanpaper.paint
2 months
Cleanpaper.paint
3 months
Clean,paperpaint
2 months
Clean,paperpaint
2 months
2-family
3-family
3-family
1-family
1-family
3-family
2-fanily
condo
2-family
condo
condo
$45,000
$42,000
$4?, 000
$19,000
$35,000
$52,000
$42,000
$25,000
$55,000
$25,000
$30,000
years
years
years
years
years
years'
years
years
years
years
years
2 1
5 1
6 1
8 1
9 !
1
F
F
M
F
M
F
F
M
F
M
F
M
M
F
M
M
F
39
29
22
23
34
30
31.
46
49
35
24
30
30
52
32
28
I
Asian I
I
White I
White I
White I
I
Black I
Black I
White I
Hispanic!
Hispanic I
Black I
Black I
Black I
Hispanic I
White I
White I
Black I
Black I
I
Single I
I
Single I
Single I
Single I
Married
Couple I
Single I
Marriedl
Couple I
Marr ied I
Couple I
Single I
Married
Couple I
Single I
Marr ied I
Couple I
2
0
0
0
3
2
2
4
2
2
0
2
- --------------- - --- -- ---------------- -- -- -------- ---- -- ----------
- ----- -- ------- ----
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apartments do exist, most landlords dislike renting to
larger families.
At the higher end of the scale is an income of $21,000
for a household of one. This is somewhat above 80% of the
area's median income for a family of one, which is
approximately $18,000. Also, one household appears to have
a combined income of $34,000. This high amount of income is
certainly cause for concern in terms of following the goals
to serve those who have low- to moderate-income. Given the
income requirements Dorchester Bay follows, it is not clear
why it permitted this household to participate.
The data also indicate that the homesteading program
did not result in loss of ownership opportunity to local
lower income families by an influx of upper income
professionals. According to 1980 census data, the average
median family income for the area of Dorchester Bay is
approximately $11,577. (This number was arrived at by taking
the average the median income for families in the census
tracts which cover the target neighborhood. For specific
tract numbers and census data see Appendix A.)(26) The
figures from the homesteader data cluster around this
number, some higher, some lower. There is no apparent
evidence of an influx of outsiders with higher incomes
picking up the properties at merely the price of
rehabilitation and thereby removing the house from the reach
of lower income local residents.
The occupational characteristics of the homesteaders
also support the conclusion that the program did not result
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in an invasion of higher income professionals. The
occupations are not those of higher income professionals,
but rather are service or or lower paying professional
positions. Further, their occupations are similar to the
occupations held by others in the neighborhood. The
following table extracts occupational information of the
applicable job categories for the neighborhood overall and
the comparable data from the homesteaders. The percentage
is calculated on the basis of the total number of workers
over the age of sixteen.
TABLE 2
% of total working
population
Type of Occupation neighborhood homesteaders
Executive, administrative,
managerial 4% 1 9%
Professional specialty 4% 1 9%
Administrative support 14% 2 18%
Service occupations 10% 5 45%
Operators, fabricators,
laborers 12% 2 18%
As shown in the table above, the majority of the
occupations of the homesteaders are service, administrative
support or labor. These job categories do not represent
higher paying professional positions. Rather, they come
under the headings of "pink" or "blue collar" jobs, jobs
with lower status, lower pay. The table also indicates that
those pink and blue collar jobs outweigh the higher paying
professional occupations in the neighborhood as a whole.
The homesteading program does not bring in groups not
already prevalent within the overall neighborhood. Instead
it makes a good effort to serve the existing residents in
(27)
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lower income brackets.
Other demographic charateristics also indicate that
homesteading did not take away ownership opportunities from
lower income local residents. The homesteaders are almost
evenly divided by race--six are white, seven are black.
There is one asian, one hispanic. The overall neighborhood
population is 68% white and 20% black.(27) With the
majority of homesteaders divided almost equally between
black and white, the proportions of black and white
homesteaders at least match the neighborhood proportions,
and in fact indicate a tendency to encourage black
participation. The neighborhood asian population is .5%
(28), making the 6% asian participation in the program also
in accordance with neighborhood percentages.
As well, Dorchester has a fairly large hispanic
population, with 14% of residents having Spanish origin.(29)
Three hispanics, or 17% of the homesteading population,
well serves the local population of hispanics, a population
which tends to be especially in need of affordable housing.
Eight of the homesteaders have dependent children,
supporting the City's aim to use homesteading to provide
housing for those with children. In the case of the
homesteaders, 5 households or 45% are married couples with
children and 2 households or 18% are households headed by
females. This compares to 58% and 35% respectively in the
neighborhood as a whole. Thus, it appears that female-
headed households are somewhat unserved by the homesteading
program.
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The majority of the homesteaders are single. This further
demonstrates the homesteading program's attempts to provide
housing to people who have difficulty finding it on their
own. In the present ownership market, inflated houses
prices combined with high mortgage rates make buying a home
financially very difficult for any single person with only
one income. Those single people with low to moderate
incomes find it even more of a hardship. The homesteading
program offers them an opportunity to own a house where they
otherwise would not have the option. In conclusion, it
seems that to the extent that Dorchester Bay participated in
the homesteading program, the properties in Dorchester
indicate a success on the part of the homesteading program
in following up on its goals to make housing ownership
opportunities available to lower income City residents.
CASE 2: ROXBURY MULTI-SERVICE CENTER
PROGRAM SERVICE
The other case, Roxbury Multi-Service Center, began
producing homesteading properties in 1981, about the same
time as Dorchester Bay EDC. To date, however, they have
turned over three properties to the homesteaders, with six
more waiting for processing and closing. The data on the
nine properties showing both property characteristics and
homesteader characteristics are summarized in Tables 3A and
3B. The tables list the properties in order of date of
processing. Racial data were not available. Just as with
Dorchester Bay, the sample size is very small and the same
TABLE 3A
Property Characteristics: Roxbury
Sweat Equity/
Rehab
Cleanpaperpaint
3 months
Clean,paper,paint
3 months
Cleanpaperpaint
3 months
Clean,paper,paint
3 months
Clean,paperpaint
3 months
Cleanpaper,paint
3 months
Cleanpaperpaint
3 months
Clean,paperpaint
2 months
Cleanpaperpaint
3 months
Mortgage
30 years.
MHFA
30 years,
MHFA
30 years,
MHFA
30 years,
MHFA
30 years,
MHFA
30 years,
MHFA
30 years,
MHFA
30 years,
MHFA
30 years,
MHFA
9.5%
9.5%
9.5%
9.5%
9.5%
9.5%
9.5%
9.5%
9.5%
Building
Type
TABLE 3
Homesteader Characteristics: Roxbury
Sex Age Marital
34
32
37
32
35
35
38
32
28
30
# Previous Income
Status Child
Single I 1 I
Single I 2 1
I I
Single I 3 I
Single 1 3 1
I I
Single I 1 I 
Single I 2 1
I I
Single I 1 I
I I
Single I 1 I
I I
Single I 0 I
Single I 0 1
Address
Roxbury
Roxbury
Dorchester
Dorchester
Roxbury
Roxbury
Allston/
Brighton
South End
Roxbury
Roxbury
$24,000
$22,000
$25,000
$14,000
$21,000
$20,000
$21,000
$18,000
$18,000
$10,000
Occupation
Policeman
Teacher
Administrator
Nurse's Aid
Program Administrator
Medical Assistant
Teacher
Dental Hygenist
Group Counselor
Secretary
Sales
Price
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
9
Residency
Reqirement
I 3 years
i 3 years
I 3 years
1 5 years
I 5 years,
I 5 years
I 5 years
1 5 years
I 5 years
$29,000
$24, 000
$40,000
$40,000
$35, 000
$37,500
$45,000
$36,000
$45,000
2-family
2-faily
2-fami ly
3-fami ly
condo
condo
condo
condo
condo
1
2
5
6
7
8
9
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caution should be applied.
The demographics for the Roxbury program are less
clearly low income than those for Dorchester. Part of the
reason for this is that the income guidelines followed by
Roxbury MSC are somewhat different from those at Dorchester
Bay. Income limits for homesteaders in Roxbury require a
cap of $30,000 per household, regardless of family size.
(This was the second of two choices for income restrictions
offered in the program description issued at the start of
the homesteading program back in 1976.)(30). It is not
clear from program staff why Roxbury chose this restriction
rather than 80% of the area's median income. It certainly
is not because the Roxbury neighborhood has a higher median
income and needs a higher limit. The average median income
in Roxbury is only $9,833, as opposed to $11,577 in
Dorchester.(31) If anything, Roxbury should have lower
limits than Dorchester. This calls into question whether
the Roxbury program serves low to moderate income people.
As a result of the difference in restrictions, the
incomes shown are a bit higher than those in Dorchester. In
Roxbury, the lowest is $14,000 for a family of 4. The other
end of the scale includes a combined household income of
approximately $28,000 for a family of two. Although this is
within the guidelines for low -moderate income as set by the
program, it suggests that the ceiling of $30,000 might not
be as appropriate as Dorchester Bay's restrictions. The
incomes shown for Roxbury are on the high end of the low-
moderate income scale, especially in light of the fact that
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the average median income for the neighborhood is only
$9,833.(32) (See Census Tract data in Appendix for
figures). In spite of this, the service of Roxbury Multi-
Service Center to low to moderate income people must not be
entirely disregarded. Although not as clearly low to
moderate income as Dorchester Bay, Roxbury Multi-Service
still serves people who could not otherwise enter the
homeownership market. With salaries in the teens and
twenties, certainly none of these families could buy a home
in the highly inflated private market.
The occupations of the homesteaders similarly show
service to the higher end of the
scale. As demonstrated in Table
homesteaders hold administrative
positions. The other half work
administrative support sectors.
provide affordable housing for a
of higher income professionals.
homesteading population works in
the highest single salary of the
low to moderate income
4, one half of the
or professional specialty
in the service and
Thus, the program did not
population entirely made up
One half of the
"pink" collar work. Also,
Roxbury homesteaders is
only $25,000. Therefore, even the positions coming under
the administrative and professional specialty categories are
at the lower end of the income scale for jobs of that type.
Roxbury Multi-Service does not serve the local blue
collar population as well as Dorchester Bay. In Roxbury,
none of the homesteaders work at laborer or operator jobs.
In a neighborhood with 20% of the overall population in low
paying, low status labor positions, a program to provide
34
affordable housing should include that population.
TABLE 4
% of total working
population
Type of Occupation neighborhood homesteaders
Executive, administrative, # %
managerial 3% 2 20%
Professional specialty 9% 3 30%
Administrative support 23% 1 10%
Service occupations 27% 4 40%
Operators, fabricators
laborers 20% 0 0%
(33)
In the Roxbury data, all except for one household is
headed by female heads of households, and all heads of
households were single. This compares with a population of
female headed households in the overall neighborhood of 51%.
The Roxbury program shines with regards to attempting to
house this group which has difficulty entering the ownership
market. As I discussed before, the high costs of
homeownership make it hard for most people with a single
income. This is especially true for low to moderate income
people.
In serving female-headed households, Roxbury is much
truer to the neighborhood situation than Dorchester Bay.
But with the working population, Dorchester Bay more closely
serves its neighborhood picture. Between the two groups,
the homesteading program managed to alleviate housing
difficulties for those who traditionally suffer in both the
rental and the ownership market. Without the program, of
the homesteader households would not have been able to
purchase a house through traditional means.(34)
While Roxbury homesteaders tend more toward the
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moderate end of the low to moderate income scale, the
program still succeeds in providing ownership to people who
would not otherwise be able to enter the ownership market.
This being the case, the homesteading properties in Roxbury
indicate a success on the part of the homesteading program
in following up on its goals to make homeownership
opportunities available to lower income City residents.
ANALYSIS
The properties in both Dorchester and Roxbury indicate
a success on the part of the homesteading program in
following up on its goals to make housing ownership
opportunities available to lower income City residents. To
understand the consequences of this success, it is helpful
to look at the two non-profits's program in terms of the
factors involved in a homesteading program: administrative
organization, homesteader selection, financing and sweat
equity.
PROGRAM OPERATION
ADMINISTRATION
Boston's program is run by a central homesteading
office which coordinates all the activities from choosing
potential sites for homesteading, to providing actual
finances as well as coordination of mortagage monies, to
creating and monitering guidelines for the program. It then
contracts out the operation within the neighborhoods to
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local non-profit agencies. In "contracting out", the
central office provides administrative expenses for the
homesteading portion of the non-profit's operation. The
non-profit agencies buy the properties from the City, hire
contractors to renovate them and sell them to the
homesteaders.
The selection of properties and determination of an
appropriate sales price is a joint effort between the
central office and the non-profit. When it learns of an
abandoned property, either from the Homesteading Office or
through a private owner, Dorchester Bay looks at the
property, estimates rehabilitation costs and sends a basic
pro forma to the central office.
At this point, the Rehabilitation and Market staff from
the central office look at the property and Dorchester Bay's
projections. They estimate the rehabilitation required to
meet building code standards. They question if the
rehabilitation can be done within the direct subsidy given
by the central office. This subsidy is $5,000 in direct
grant towards rehabilitating the property. The grant goes
to the non-profit rather than the homesteader. Some
negotiation occurs and the central office makes the final
decision as to an appropriate sales price. (35)
Roxbury MSC starts by looking at the area and the
house, comparing the local market to the homesteading site.
At the same time, going at it from the other side, the staff
first estimates what an appropriate rent would be for the
site given the market and using Section 8 rent guidelines.
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This provides an example of appropriate and affordable
monthly charges for the property which can then be used to
calculate an affordable mortgage amount. Next the staff
looks at the income level of the homesteader to see the
amount of a mortgage the homesteader could carry. Weighing
all of these numbers, it then backs into a sales price for
the buyer. The estimates are subject to approval by the
rehabilitation staff in the Central Office.(36)
Although Dorchester and Roxbury arrive at the purchase
price for their homesteading units in a different manner,
this seems to make no difference on the cost to the
homesteader. The prices of the units are similar (See
Tables 1A and 3A). And whether or not the sales prices is
considered the price of the rehabilitation, the process is
the same. The homesteader pays the sales price and moves
into an almost totally renovated unit. In either case, the
sales price covers the cost of rehabilitation.
HOMESTEADER SELECTION
Once the Homesteading Office and the non-profit choose
properties and decide on the sales price and required
rehabilitation work, the central office puts out
notification of available properities. Potential
homesteaders submit their application for a specific
property directly to Dorchester Bay EDC and Roxbury Multi-
Service Center. The staff at the non-profits complete
credit checks and financial verifications on all of the
applicants.
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Those who pass the credit check, who are Boston
residents, and who are within the low-moderate income
guidelines undergo another review. This second stage
reviews the applications without knowing the applicant's
identity. The non-profit prepares a summary of each case
and submits it along with blind applications (all forms of
personal identification removed) to a Community Review
board. The City appoints five community residents to this
review board. Based on the summary of the homesteader
circumstances and any accompanying letters or documents
explaining special circumstances, they make the final
decision as to who will homestead the properties. Such
letters might include a description of family size,
difficulty in locating housing, recent eviction from a home,
or a desire to renovate a home. The board members are
community people who know the area housing market.
Sometimes they are homeowners, sometimes not. Their
decision is objective insofar as the identity of the
homesteaders remains hidden during the selection
process.(37)
FINANCING
After homesteader selection, the non-profits worry
about financing for the homesteader. Dorchester Bay and
Roxbury MSC do not do the legwork for mortgage shopping.
That responsibility remains in the hands of the central
office. The central office keeps abreast of the local
lending scene and arranges the mortgages.(38) Lately,
Dorchester Bay and Roxbury MCS have been using mortagages
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from the Massachusatts Housing Finance Agency. Prior to
that, The Bank of New England provided mortgages to
homesteaders. The mortgages from the MHFA have been
available at 5% down, with varying low interest rates. The
homesteader takes a loan for 90% of the purchase price. The
homesteader must put down 5% in cash, or approximately
$2,100, as a downpayment.(39)
SWEAT EQUITY/REHABILITATION
To cover the other 5% of the downpayment, the
homesteader is supposed to put sweat equity in the building.
At the time the two non-profits began working on
homesteading properties, the sweat equity requirements had
already been reduced to light cosmetic work.
In order to only require cosmetic work from the
homesteaders, the non-profits hire contractors through the
bid process to complete the rest of the rehabilitation. The
non-profit staff investigates the property and makes the
decisions as to what sort of renovation is necessary. The
contractors complete any demolition, put in heating systems
and plumbing. They also perform all carpentry, build and
install walls, floors, windows. The homesteaders have no
role in deciding what the house should look like. They move
in once the work is nearly completed. The total costs of
the rehabilitation run between $20,000 to $55,000 in total,
the amount of which detemines the sales price to the
homesteader.
This leaves only light rehabilitation required for
sweat equity on the part of the homesteader. It includes
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painting the walls and the woodwork, sanding and finishing
the floor and cleaning the assorted nails, sawdust and
debris left by the contractors.(40) If this activity is
supposed to cover 5% of the sales price, or approximately
$2,100, it means using very expensive paint and other costly
decorating tools, a notion not in keeping with the
affordable housing notion. In other words, light cosmetic
sweat equity does not really cover a 5% downpayment.
Therefore, that "5% sweat equity" becomes merely a grant, an
outright subsidy from the city for the homesteader.
I find this troublesome. First, the homesteaders have
no choice about the renovation. They take no part in the
decision about the shape their housing would take. This is
unfortunte, since the homesteading model provides an
excellent opportunity for choice by the homesteader. If he
completes the majority of the work himself, he determines
what the interior looks like, what type and how much repair
he does. He has independence through a homesteading program
where sweat equity entails heavy rehabilitation work. If
the opportunity exists, it seems limited not to take
advantage of the opportunity to provide the independence and
the other benefits sweat equity homesteading offers.
I asked various program officials why the program did
not encourage this independence through requiring the
homesteaders to complete the majority of the renovation
themselves. All of the program officials responded
similarly: expecting a minimum of sweat equity from the
homesteaders provided the only means by which they could
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complete properties under the homesteading program. More
stringent requirements could not be implemented due to
resistence by homesteaders. Applicants would not agree to
or have the ability to contribute more in the way of sweat
equity.(41)
I disagree with this assessment. There is no reason to
assume that homesteaders do not have the ability or the
desire to refurbish their homes themselves. I am not sure
why program staff in Boston choose to make this assumption.
As I will show later in the paper, it is possible for
inexperienced homesteaders to perform rehabilitation on
homes even as large as the type in Boston. Homesteaders in
Providence do exactly this. They are homesteaders similar
to those in Boston. They have no previous skills. They
want to build their own home from an abandoned shell and
they manage to do so economically.
This question of the economy of self-help points to
another advantage of sweat equity homesteading. In Boston's
case, the homesteaders must purchase the home from the non-
profit at "the cost of rehabilitation." For the Dorchester
and Roxbury properties, this ranges from $29,000 to $55,000.
However, the non-proftis decide on the amount and type of
rehabilitation and thus the cost of the unit to the
homesteaders. Therefore, if the homesteader wishes to
rehabilitate the house more cheaply or perform jobs himself
he cannot do so.
For example, say in a bid accepted by Dorchester Bay,
contractor asks $10,000 to remodel a kitchen. This includes
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new cabinets, counter, appliances and plumbing. In Boston's
program, this work is already completed when the tenant
moves in. He has no choice about doing the job himself to
reduce the cost. On the other hand, with a real sweat
equity component, the homesteader would remodel the kitchen
himself. His only cost would be the materials. He would
save the contractor's fee and any overhead the contractor
might pass on in providing the materials. Also, he might
choose to do without a dishwasher or ceramic floor tiles or
other items which would save on costs.
I also wonder whether the use of contractors accounts
for the small number of properties put out by Dorchester Bay
and Roxbury Multi-Service. In four years of operation, only
twenty homesteading properties came through. When using
contractors for the rehabilitation, the non-profit does not
allow homesteaders to move in until contractors finished
their work. Turning out homesteading properties means
waiting for the completion of all contracted work. However,
the non-profit has no real control over the contractors once
it hires them. Contractors belong to unions, they work at
their own pace. Waiting for completion of contract work
could easily slow up the turning out of habitable
properties.
The homesteading program staff believes the opposite to
be the case. They claim that leaving rehabilitation to the
homesteader makes the process painfully slow. Perhaps in
the Boston experince, this was the case. However, I will
show later in this paper that with the appropriate support
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structure within the homesteading program, it is possible
operate a very productive program without using contractors
for heavy work but rather by relying on sweat equity.
In summary, Dorchester Bay EDC and Roxbury Multi-
Service Center managed to put out a limited number of
homesteading properties under the Boston Urban Homesteading
model. The homes provided ownership opportunities to low to
moderate income families who could not have purchased homes
on the open market. They started out with the HUD model of
the "needy" homesteader, where self-help is at a premium and
the use of contractors is minimized. Boston's program found
that in order to make the program work, it was necessary to
undertake all of the contracting itself and leave only a
bare minimum for the homesteaders.
This does not mean that the Boston Homesteading program
failed. As I discussed in the introduction, any program
which produces housing units for low to moderate income
individuals has merit. I am not arguing that Boston must
use homesteading in its true form to provide housing.
However, pure homesteading offers independence and self-
determination to the homesteader. It also offers an
economical way to rehabilitate the structure. The program
in Boston says this true type of homesteading is not
possible. I will show that with the appropriate program
design, it is indeed possible.
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CHAPTER FOUR: URBAN HOMESTEADING--PROVIDENCE
STOP WASTING ABANDONED PROPERTY
A homesteading program in Providence, Rhode Island has
exactly this type of strong sweat equity component. The
program is called Stop Wasting Abandoned Property (SWAP).
It is a private, non-profit organization and it has
rehabilitated over 400 properties since 1975 under the
homesteading model. SWAP has succeeded where other programs
such as Boston failed in including true sweat equity into
its program design. How did SWAP manage this? What other
things did SWAP have to give up to achieve succcess in this
department? Did the low-moderate income standards have to
be dropped? Did the structure of the organization have to
change? The answers to these questions should bring
to light the elements necessary to produce a true sweat
equity homesteading program.
PROGRAM HISTORY
Stop Wasting Abandoned Property (SWAP) began its
operation in 1976 as a grassroots effort to curb the severe
housing abandonment problem in Providence. It never applied
to participate in the HUD demonstration but instead remained
a community-based effort. In an effort to preserve the
housing stock, SWAP created a program to help people with
lots of energy and without much money purchase the abandoned
homes and rehabilitate them. Over the ten years of
operation, SWAP has produced 400 rehabilitated houses, which
translates into 900 units of housing.(42)
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PROGRAM DESIGN
Similar to the non-profit organizations who
participate in Boston's program, SWAP searches for and
examines the properties for homesteading. But, SWAP is a
broker of the abandoned houses to prospective homesteaders.
It does not hold the title to the properties at any point.
The homesteader takes direct ownership. Also, a difference
with the SWAP program comes in the source for properties.
The City of Providence owns no abandoned houses. Therefore,
SWAP must look to private owners to secure properties for
homesteading. Its search for properties is much more
involved than in Boston, where most of the properties come
from the City's stock. It must find abandoned properties,
locate the owner, and then persuade him or her to sell.
Once it has arranged a sale, SWAP then negotiates a sales
price for the house, usually between $2,000 and $5,000.
After SWAP locates properties, it examines the
property, does thorough specs and then puts out a listing of
available properties for sale. The staff helps families as
they approach the program to decide if they want to
participate in such a time-consuming and difficult project.
SWAP further assists the families in locating the necessary
financing for a property appropriate for their needs and
desires. The housing and rehabilitation staff go over
renovation needs and supervise in the choice of contractors
and materials. They also run classes on rehabilitation
techniques. Throughout the course of the homesteaders'
project, SWAP maintains a close counseling relationship to
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support the homesteader. The idea is to provide as much
support as possible for the homesteaders to carry out almost
all of the rehabilitation work themselves.
PROGRAM OPERATION
ADMINISTRATION
SWAP is run by an administrative staff of six, an
executive director, a receptionist, a property lister, two
housing counselors and a rehabilitation specialist. The
organization began staffed by volunteers in 1976, but the
administration has since become permanent. The
lister spends most of his time tracking down the owners of
abandoned properties and convincing them to sell.(43)
SWAP is governed by a community-based Board of
Directors which is made up of 60% homesteaders and the rest
interested community members. Homesteaders also constitute
two thirds of the administrative staff. Those who run the
program have a very personal commitment to making the
program run effectively and productively.
FINANCING
SWAP is not a city agency. It does not have available
the same amount of funding as is available to a city-backed
agency for adminstrative salaries and costs of operation or
for loan-collateral funds. One half of its operating
budget comes from Community Development Block Grant monies
apportioned by the City of Providence. Another small
portion is Federal Emergency Managment Act money. The state
gives no money to SWAP. The rest of the budget comes from
community support.
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The budget covers staff salaries, tools and subsidies
for the units. Through the CDBG funds, SWAP has been able
to give grants to the homesteaders of between $5,000 and
$7,000 for downpayments on the houses. This is similar to
the $5,000 in subsidy the Homesteading Office in Boston
gives the non-profits for each homesteading property. (It
must be noted that for the upcoming fiscal year, the City
has cut out the CDBG funds to SWAP. Therefore, with future
properties, SWAP will not have the financial capacity to
offer these grants to the homesteaders.)(44)
Once SWAP has helped the homesteader gather a
downpayment and other necessary closing costs, it aids in
securing mortgage financing. SWAP researches the best
available rates in the area and arranges for the
homesteaders to make their application, but the homesteader
is responsible for securing the loan.
Most of the loans are conventional fixed rate mortgages
at the current interest rate. Many of the homesteaders have
been able to get construction loans to start up with and
then have switched to regular financing. Local banks have
been cooperative with the homesteading venture, reports the
director of SWAP, David Karoff.(45)
Other loan sources have been available from time to
time for homesteaders. Providence has low-interest loan
programs which allocate funds by neighborhood, as well as
some 6% loan money for historical houses. Boston's program
has been able to use MHFA (Massachusatts Housing Finance
Agency) to get low interest loans for homesteaders.
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Unfortunately, SWAP does not have this option due to the
fact that the RIHFA, Rhode Island's cousin to the MHFA, is
struggling from corruption and scandal and is therefore not
a source for funds at the moment.(46)
HOMESTEADER SELECTION
Homesteader selection at SWAP is a much simpler
procedure than the one followed by Boston's homesteading
program. "First come, first served," sums up the process.
People come into the offfice when they have heard about a
property for sale. They fill out an application detailing
financial information. They must have enough resources to
close at the bank and to cover payments for 60%-70% of total
rehabilitation costs. It is important to note that the
homesteading applicants are not skilled carpenters or
contractors. They do not have any special qualifications or
skills for doing the rehabilitation work.
There is no income ceiling for homesteading applicants,
but the median income for present homesteaders is $13,500.
The director of SWAP, David Karoff, does not feel an income
"requirement" is necessary. It works out that incomes of
those coming to the program remain quite low without
mandating restrictions.(47)
There are no other mandated requirements, but the
homesteaders tend to come from the City of Providence. SWAP
programs are scattered throughout the City and keeping
people in the same neighborhood is not quite as much of a
concern as within Boston where historically the concept of
the "neighborhood" holds particular importance.
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Recently, a problem developed when Boston developers
began to become aware of the cheap abandoned houses
available in Providence and started buying them up,
inflating the prices in the Providence market and taking
away the opportunity from low income local residents. As a
result, SWAP has stopped listing with realtors the abandoned
properties it locates and instead must advertise the
homesteading properties by word-of-mouth.(48)
Other demographic characteristics of the homesteaders
are interesting in comparison to the population served by
the program in Boston. Individual data were not available
from SWAP at the time of the interview with the program
director. However, SWAP puts out summary characteristics on
the homesteaders. Racially, the homesteaders are
approximately 50% hispanic, 25% black, and 25% white. These
proportions for the most part represent the proportions in
the city population, according to the organization's
director.(49)
The large representation of hispanics in the Providence
project indicates SWAP's ability to provide a homesteading
program which manages to serve those on the lowest end of
the income scale, where the hispanic population still tends
to be located in American cities.
Homesteaders in the Providence program are 80%
families, primarily traditional families with two parents
and children.(50) This is different than homesteading in
Boston, which attempts to house single-parent families and
single people, those who find it particularly difficult to
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enter the ownership market. SWAP has done a few
homesteading projects with groups of single people and other
family types, but they like to work with traditional nuclear
families.(51) Perhaps this is because of the support
structure of the traditional family unit which can help
homesteaders through the very difficult and trying project
of renovating a home from scratch.
SWEAT EQUITY/REHABILITATION
The final aspect of the SWAP program is the most
crucial one, sweat equity/rehabilitation. This point
differs the most radically from the program in Boston and is
the core of homesteading. SWAP homesteaders perform almost
all (in some cases, all) of the rehabilation themselves.
This includes all of the demolition work, which is a heavy
job given the severely dilapidated state of the properties.
All framing, carpentry, all exterior work also are completed
by the homesteaders, as well as the interior cosmetic work.
SWAP makes the initial survey about what is necessary to
make the house habitable, but the homesteader makes the real
decisions. For electrical work and heavy plumbing, SWAP
homesteaders often hire contractors. By law, people in
single-family structures are allowed to do their own
electrical work, and many attempt to do so. Owners of
multi-family dwellings are required to hire liscensed
electricians and most of them follow the law.(52)
What is special about SWAP's sweat equity element is
the support it gives to the homesteaders. The housing
counselors follow along with the homesteaders from beginning
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to end. They advise homesteaders on rehabilitation
possibilities, the timetable in which to complete the
project, which contractors to choose for electrical work and
plumbing systems.(53) Throughout this process, SWAP's
rehabilitation and housing staff consult with the
homesteaders, offering suggestions and teaching technical
skills. Using the homesteading houses as the classroom, the
rehabilitation staff person -runs classes on how to use
tools, fix things, build things, any skills homesteaders
need to know to complete the renovation on their homes.
Further support comes from the Tool Bank. SWAP runs a
tool collective where homesteaders may borrow tools and
equipment, such as hammers, drills, electric saws.(54) This
helps keep down the cost to the homesteader of buying tools,
as well as lending to the cooperative and supportive spirit
of the program.
Homesteaders must live in the house for two years after
they buy it, but other than that, there are no restrictions
on what they can do with it. Owners may rent units in a
multi-family structure to anyone they wish, regardless of
income of the tenant. The amount of renovation done to the
house is entirely the owner's choice. He can perform the
bare minimum in order to pass building code inspection, or
he can pour hundreds of thousands of dollars into the
structure.
The lack of restrictions within the program could
create a potential for an influx of higher income
professionals into the area. Owners could rent to high-
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paying tenants, bringing in higher payed professionals and
taking away the affordable housing opportunity from lower
income residents. On the other hand, low income owners
could come in, rehabilitate the house and sell it to a high
income person, again removing the property from affordable
stock.
Another possible point where abuse could occur comes
with the sweat equity component. David Karoff, director of
SWAP stresses the point that although they have a heavy
sweat equity component, it is not a requirement.
Theoretically, then, someone with a high income could move
in and contract all of the work out.(55) However, says
Karoff, this does not happen. He points out the median
income of $13,500 for the homesteaders, hardly in the upper
income bracket. As well, homesteading is not easy. The
properties are severely distressed and the neighborhoods
declining and often unsafe. Wealthier people have no desire
to move to those neighborhoods. Neither has there been a
problem of investors buying up the abandoned houses and
renovating them for sale. The project of rehabilitation is
far too burdensome to make it an attractive investment
opportunity.(56)
In fact, Karoff attributes the success of SWAP to this
very lack of actual requirements. Homesteaders have a
choice about how much and what type of renovation they want
to do. They can scavenge and hunt for scraps of wood and
old kitchen cabinets. Or they can buy new cabinets and put
stained glass in the windows. All homesteaders buy the
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houses for between $1,500 and $5,000. After that, they
decide what makes the houses habitable. Although no numbers
were available, according to Karoof, the rehabiliation cost
averages around $7,000, but it can go up from there if the
homesteader can come up with the funds.(57)
This seems to be the essence of the homesteading ideal.
The homesteaders get the house for a very modest sum. They
then must fix up the house and live in it for two years.
Almost all of the rehabilitatition work on the houses the
homesteaders accomplish through self-help. No one tells the
homesteaders what the house should look like--they makes
decisions independently. They can buy and refurbish a home
for as little as $7,000. The program manages to serve lower
income city residents. It has produced over 400 properties
over the years with only 15 or 16 that failed to follow
through to completion.
This type of program is precisely what Boston's
homesteading staff labeled as impossible to implement. Yet
Providence managed to implement it very productively. In
the next chapter, I compare the two programs in more detail
to uncover what makes it possible to run a true sweat equity
homesteading program.
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CHAPTER FIVE: HOMESTEADING--BOSTON VERSUS PROVIDENCE
Why could Providence manage such a strong and
productive homesteading program based on true sweat equity
and Boston could not? Boston claimed that homesteading did
not work until it cut away the amount of sweat equity
required of the homesteaders. And even with a much reduced
requirement, the homesteading program has only put out 175
homesteading houses in ten years as compared to 400 over the
same ten years from a program which followed the reportedly
impossible heavy sweat equity component.
The difference in productivity between the two programs
becomes even clearer in light of the proportion of
homesteading units as compared to the overall number of
housing units in each city. The City of Boston has
approximately 220,000 housing units,(58) as compared to 175
homesteading units. Providence has approximately 60,000
units in total(59), with 400 homesteading units. Boston has
more than three and a half times as many overall units than
Providence. Yet, Providence produced more than two times as
many homesteading units.
ADMINISTRATION/ORGANIZATION
The two programs are administrated in a different
way. One is run by a City agency. The City agency designs,
structures and directs the program and hires non-profit
community development corporations to run the program. The
other program is a private non-profit group, independent of
the City. This could both work for and against facilitating
a heavy sweat equity program.
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A City agency has more funds available to it than does
a small non-profit. Administrative costs such as staff
salaries present no problem in a City agency homesteading
program. Those costs need not come directly out of the
homesteading budget. This frees up homesteading resources
to be used for subsidy to the homesteaders. The increased
facility for subsidy increases the possibility for
production of homesteading properties. The more direct
subsidy the homesteaders have, the lower the incomes they
need to carry out the project and the sooner they can start
on renovation.
This would be especially true if the per unit cost of
renovation remained consistent across the programs. In the
cases of Boston and Providence, the housing stock is very
similar. Homesteading properties in both cities are large
wood frame houses with several stories, porches, exterior
woodwork. Therefore, costs of rehabilitating the
hoemsteading properties in the two cities should not differ
significantly. Frank Tate, Boston's program director,
claims rehabilitation costs in Boston to be among the
highest in the country. But he goes on to state the per
unit rehabilitation subsidy cost as between $8,000 to
$10,000.(63) This is not significantly more than
Providence, which averages $7,000 per unit.
However, there is some discrepency in the Boston
rehabilitation figures. On the one hand, staff quotes the
per unit rehabilitation subsidy cost at around $10,000. Yet
Dorchester Bay bases its sales price on what it calls the
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cost of rehabilitation, which comes out between $22,000 and
$55,000. I do not understand the difference between these
numbers, or why Boston finds it costs so much to renovate
properties of the same type and size of those in Providence.
Whatever the costs for rehabilitation, "subsidy" still
means reducing the cost to the person being subsidized.
Therefore, the fact remains that a heavier subsidy to the
homesteaders should facilitate the rehabilitation process,
even if the rehabilitation is expensive. A City agency with
a larger budget should have more of an opportunity to
subsidize self-help rehabilitation. If anything, then,
Boston should be able to more deeply subsidize its
homesteaders because it has more funds available. If the
costs of rehabilitation are a little higher, it should not
matter. Besides, self-help homesteading lowers the costs of
rehabilitation by taking away the need for contractors and
reducing the costs of materials to the homesteader by
allowing choice on the work to be done. If Boston followed
this model, the higher rehabilitation costs would not
present such a problem.
Another place where the City agency structure should
work to the advantage of a homesteading program is in
securing properties to homestead. In addition to the HUD
properties available to the cities participating in the
Homesteading Demonstrations, which Boston used earlier on in
its program's development, the City of Boston itself owns
many potential homesteading sites. It has not been
necessary to pour a significant amount of staff time into
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convincing citizens to sell vacant and abandoned houses.
SWAP has had none of these advantages. It has had to
finance through its small budget a full time staff person
devoted exclusively to locating abandoned poperties,
tracking down absent owners unwilling to sell and then
trying to convince each of them to sell the property. Yet
despite the lack of resources, SWAP still has turned out
over twice as many properties under homesteading while
utilizing real sweat equity in a way Boston could not.
What SWAP lost by not having access to the same
resources as a City agency, it gained in its autonomy. A
grass-roots organization operates on its own, free from
bureaucratic red tape and complicated levels of
accountability. Moving projects through a governmental
hierarchy always takes more time than necessary for proper
signatures and approval. Both organizations began in 1976,
but SWAP already began homesteading properties while Boston
sat waiting to start its program.
Linked to the problem of moving through the bureaucracy
is the role of politics in City-run programs. Approval of
activities on different levels often becomes a matter of
political maneuvering. If a powerful faction finds
homesteading objectionable, funds for contracting out to the
non-profit organizations may suddenly become a political
football, tossed at the whim of City officials. SWAP,
operating independently, remains free from the potential
political stumbling blocks.
While Boston's program is only a small part of the
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City's overall community development operation, SWAP focuses
entirely on homesteading. All energies, financial and
otherwise, go towards the one goal. This is important
because when allocating money and time, SWAP does not have
to make choices between conflicting program needswhich could
result in shortchanging on one or another program. As well,
its staff is hired with homesteading in mind. Staff in a
city agency often come into their jobs to perform several
different functions and must spread their talents thinly
across many projects. SWAP has only one type of project.
Since it focuses on this, it can therefore produce more
effectively and more efficiently as a pure homesteading
program.
It is true, however, that the Boston homesteading
program contracts out to non-profit organizations to perform
more of the operation and the specialized tasks. These
community-based non-profits function similarly to SWAP.
Their administrative structures are alike and they have the
potential for close involvement with the homesteading
projects. Why can they not facilitate a heavy sweat equity
component following an operation like that of SWAP?
The non-profits have a problem not unlike the City of
Boston. They have a small staff and many different
projects. They too must share time, energy and funds
between a variety of projects. They cannot spend all of
their time working with homesteaders. And even if they did
have more time, the non-profits are employed by the City
under the homesteading program. They must operate their
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portion of the program within the structure set by the City
agency. The central office makes all policy decisions in
regards to sweat equity requirements, residence
requirements, income requirements. It also selects the
properties to homestead, makes mortgage arrangements, and
appoints the community board which chooses homesteaders.
The non-profits have no part in the design of any of these
elements. They merely carry out the Central Office's
instructions. Therefore, for instance, if the Central
Agency has not created a system of support for helping the
homesteaders perform the rehabilitation itself, the non-
profit may not set up its own tool bank or rehabilitation
classes. Even though the non-profit has similar structure
to SWAP, it does not really have autonomy in the
implementation of the homesteading program.
With something as challenging and difficult as self-
help homesteading it seems that independence of the
organization works in its favor. Production and efficiency
result from a program based in the field and free from the
political and managerial ties of bureaucracy. At the same
time, however, autonomy creates financial constraints and
hardships which would be alleviated by larger resources
available to a governmental agency. Therefore, an effective
sweat equity homesteading program needs a combination of
independent operation and a healthy subsidy from outside
governmental sources to produce the most efficient service.
FINANCING
The next aspect of a homesteading program, financing,
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looks like it should work against SWAP and in favor of the
Boston program in terms of allowing a productive sweat
equity-oriented homesteading program. Here SWAP is at a
disadvantage in having less access to low cost, low interest
loans for the homesteaders due to corruption in the local
financing scene. Because of this, SWAP must use
conventional mortgages with market interest rates, raising
the cost to the homesteader. In addition, regular banks are
not geared towards serving low-moderate income residents.
They prefer "safe" clients. SWAP reports that several
Providence banks have been quite cooperative in financing
homesteading properties up to this point.
However, what will happen if the mortgage market
tightens up again and the banks lose their inclination to
support homesteading? SWAP has no reliable source of low
cost mortgage money to fall back on. The low cost
neighborhood loans do not represent significant support
either, making the homesteader financing system more
uncertain in Providence than in Boston.
In regard to homesteader financing, the Boston
homesteading program has one more advantage. As a city-
backed agency with a larger resource pool to draw from, the
homesteading program in Boston was able to create a back-up
fund to serve as security for obtaining low interest loans.
Banks are more likely to grant mortgages given the security
of a collateral fund. SWAP does not have the wherewithall
to set up such a fund. Again, Boston's set-up makes
financing much easier and should aid in making overall
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operation more productive. In spite of this, SWAP still
manages to produce more while more properties under sweat
equity homesteading.
The other side of financing, the cost of the house and
the rehabilitation to the homesteader, represents a
significant difference between the two programs. In the
Boston homesteading program, the staff of the central office
and the non-profit organization arrive at the sales price
for the homesteader by investigating the property and
assessing potential renovation costs. The non-profit
decides on the rehabilitation plan for the house. Then the
non-profit estimates a cost for the rehabilitation, which
becomes the purchase price to the homesteader. The
homesteaders have no involvement in making rehabilitation
decisions.
The self-help homesteading model gives independence and
autonomy to the homesteader. It provides affordable housing
in a more economical manner than regular rehabilitation
while at the same time giving the low to moderate income
person the opportunity to determine the shape of his own
housing. This added element of autonomy changes
homesteading from a simple housing program to something more
along the lines of a community development effort.
This difference is a crucial one. It stems from the
notion that economic and social inequality have many causes.
They are not simply the result of a single event.
Therefore, policies to remedy such inequalities must attack
several different aspects of the overall problem in order to
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be effective.
This view prevails in neighborhood planning. The
approach to revitalizing distressed neighborhoods and
helping to improve the situation of the low and moderate
income residents is a multi-faceted one. Community
development looks to create housing. But it goes further
than that. It recognizes that to be able to afford housing,
people need to work. To work, the local economy must
provide the people with job opportunities. To take
advantage of job opportunities, people need training and day
care. In other words, both the community and its residents
need to grow to improve the overall picture.
Self-help homesteading takes a step beyond merely
giving a house to someone who neeeds it. It offers
homesteaders independence and autonomy in determining their
housing circumstances. By rebuilding the home on their own,
homesteaders get a sense of personal investment, of pride.
Other housing subsidy programs such as Section 8 rent
subsidies and public housing take away pride and certainly
independence. Section 8 subsidies tend to stigmatize
tenants when they approach the landlord to rent an
apartment. With the horrible and often physically
dangerous condition of public housing, tenants suffer
degradation and worse. Further, with those programs, people
must take whatever housing becomes available. Demand is so
high and supply is so low, housing choice is not possible.
Lower income people have no power to determine their housing
situation.
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Loss of hope and the power to choose characterize the
situation of many residents in distressed and ignored
communities. Rebuilding this power through self-help
homesteading offers more than another place to live. It
strengthens the community by building the personal strength
of the residents. In giving homesteaders ownership of
property in the community further develops a sense of
belonging to the community. Choice is power and power means
change. To change a distressed community, poor residents
need power. The autonomous nature of sweat equity
homesteading gives power in the housing sector of people's
lives, which is a good place to start.
Yet, the Boston program takes away this powerfully
important autonomous aspect when the non-profits plan and
carry out all of the "swdat" work themselves. Even if the
homesteaders could somehow convince the program to let them
perform most of the sweat equity work themselves, Boston's
program staff makes the decisions about the rehabilitation
work that is to be done. When it prepares the homes for
homesteading, it determines the rehabilitation plan. The
homesteader would still not have the autonomy to choose the
type or amount of work he wished to perform. He would have
to follow the program's plan for the house, not his own.
This would discourage most people from bothering to involve
themselves in the hassles of renovating a house from
scratch.
Perhaps this is what David Karoff, executive director
of SWAP, meant when he attributed the success of the program
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to the lack of specific sweat equity requirements.(60) SWAP
staff thoroughly assesses the buildings' rehabilitation
needs. But it then goes through the house with the
homesteaders to show them what must be done for safety and
liveability. SWAP helps the homesteaders to plan what they
want to do with the house. The homesteaders remain
independent in these decisions. Once they have purchased
the house, the rest is really up to them. In the SWAP
program, while rehabilitation costs average $7,000 per
homesteading unit, projects have varied from $5,000 to
$70,000. The choice rests with the homesteader.
The involvement in the rehabilitation planning process
on the part of the homesteader offers him the motivation for
carrying out the work. In a program with true self-help or
sweat equity, personal commitment is necessary for the
homesteaders to complete the arduous task of renovating an
empty shell. Involvement in the process from the planning
stage through to completion should lead to a more personal
commitment to the property than does seeing the almost
finished product of someone else's plans.
HOMESTEADER SELECTION
The homesteader pools are similar in Boston and
Providence. Neither group of potential homesteaders has any
particular skills in construction, plumbing, electrical
work. They are all low to moderate residents with similar
situations. Therefore, the reason Providence succeeded in
sweat equity does not come from the fact that its
homesteaders have training or skills that Boston
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homesteaders do not.
The way in which homesteaders are selected differs
between the two programs. SWAP takes applicants in the
order that they apply; Boston takes the pool of applicants
and chooses among them based on the qualities identified
through supporting letters and documents of the homesteader.
It would seem that either method of selection should result
in homesteaders who really want to participate in the
program. If potential homesteaders know selection occurs
on a "first-come-first-served basis," those who really want
to homestead will make sure they submit their applications
first. On the other hand, choosing from a pool of eligible
applicants should result in selection of the most willing
and most enthusiastic applications, all other things being
equal. This issue, therefore, does not appear to be crucial
to the difference in program productivity.
Another difference in the homesteader selection process
is that the Boston program has specific low-moderate income
guidelines as well as other criteria it aims to fulfill.
SWAP serves lower income residents but it has no specified
income ceiling. In terms of other criteria, Boston tries to
serve families difficult to house--single parents, displaced
families. On the other hand, SWAP almost exclusively
handles families with traditional household compositions--
two parents, one or more children.
The fact that a successful sweat equity homesteading
program almost exclusively serves traditional nuclear
families raises an interesting social dilemma for
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homesteading programs. Carrying out a homesteading project
which includes a major self-help portion is physically very
demanding. The homesteaders move into houses in a severely
dilapidated condition. Some do not have roofs or windows,
others are filled with debris. It can take several years to
complete the whole project. The physical demands of such an
undertaking can lead to emotional stress as well. All of
those invloved in the homesteading process agree that it
takes a tough person to make a good and happy homesteader.
This being the case, perhaps the traditional family
structure offers a support system which helps the
homesteaders to withstand the hardships and demands the
tough job of homesteading extends to those involved.
Certainly SWAP has been far more productive with a true
self-help program than Boston and almost all of its
participants are in traditional nuclear family settings.
Does this mean, therefore, that for a workable true
homesteading model, it is necessary for the families to
adhere to the traditional nuclear model? Within today's
social framework, this is an unrealistic and inapplicable
concept. Changing social patterns have produced a myriad of
configurations constituting "a family," many of which have
little resemblance to the traditional model. And many
provide just as much support for their members as do
traditional families.
Perhaps it might be difficult for a single adult family
member to carry out all of the rehabilitation work on his or
her own. However, it should not be impossible, especially
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if the homesteading program has a sufficient support system.
In fact, in other sweat equity housing program such as those
in Philadelphia and New York, female-headed households
dominate the homesteading families. These families have
completed the most difficult of rehabilitating tasks
themselves, regardless of the fact that they are headed by
single females.(61)
This is a very important issue because low income
families tend to be headed by single parents, people who
have great difficulty entering the ownership market. A
viable homesteading program would have to address the
housing needs of these non-traditional family types if it
were to serve as an affordable homeownership option to those
who otherwise cannot enter the market.
SWEAT EQUITY/REHABILITATION
The only way any family can complete the majority of
the rehabilitation itself is through the help of the support
system within the homesteading program. As we have already
seen, SWAP accompanies its heavy self-help portion with a
technical support structure designed to backup the
homesteaders' efforts. SWAP is there every step of the way,
from start to finish, guiding the homesteader through the
process. The guidance takes the form of counseling, a tool
bank and technical assistance on renovation methods and
rehabilitation skills. SWAP creates for the homesteader
every opportunity to succeed. A very large majority manages
to do so.
Boston, on the other hand, has no such support
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structure. Nor it does not need one, with the non-profits
supervising all of the renovations and the contracting work.
But even early in the program, when the requirements called
for much of the work to be done by the homesteaders
themselves, there was no system of emotional and technical
support. Program organizers in Boston complained that
homesteaders either failed to complete or were not
interested in beginnning a project which demanded a heavy
amount of sweat equity. Missing from the picture for timid
and inexperienced homesteaders was a staff willing to devote
time and energy to helping at every step of the process.
More importantly, no one offered a regular form of technical
assistance, a way for the homesteaders to learn the skills
required to complete the renovation work on their own.
In the original program proposal, the non-profit
components of the Boston program were meant to play the
intermediary role between the central office and the
homesteaders. The non-profit was supposed to closely
supervise the work for heavy sweat equity.(62) Boston's
program application to HUD outlined this, but that was as
far as the idea went. The program failed to design a means
by which this supervision would occur. Neither did it
structure a system to support a large-scale rehabilitation
project, such as a tool bank or working cooperative. With
these factors missing from the program design, it was bound
to fail at carrying out a true sweat equity component.
In summary, Boston's program is run by a City agency
which contracts out the work to non-profits. Because it
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exists within a government agency, it has the advantage of
funds available for both administrative and rehabilitation
costs. It also has the advantage of City-owned properties
to use for the homesteading project. What Boston lacks to
successfully carry out sweat equity is an emotional and
technical support system to aid homesteading families in
rehabilitating the properties.
SWAP uses a support system to provide the opportunity
of homesteading to over twice homesteaders as Boston.
Although it lacks the funds for administration and
rehabilitation subsidy that Boston enjoys as a City agency,
SWAP operates free from the political web of a government
agency. Its independence and the fact that homesteading is
its sole mission means the ability to devote all resources
to the homesteading endeavor. Autonomy and a technical and
emotional support system seem to be the keys to SWAP's
success. In the final chapter, I will explore how these
could work together with important elements of Boston's
program in order to formulate a workable homesteading model
which could work in other cities.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION
Boston set out trying to orchestrate a program
resembling the HUD outline for "needy" homesteaders.(63) It
wanted to serve lower income families who would be able to
offset the costs of renovating the abandoned properties by
performing much of the rehabilitation themselves. It
originally planned for a true sweat equity component, with
the homesteaders performing much of the rehabilitation
themselves.
There is no question that Boston's homesteading program
has provided affordable homeownership opportunities to lower
income Boston residents who certainly could not enter the
open ownership market. Insofar as it provided housing
without displacing local residents with upper income
professionals, Boston's homesteading program has been a
success.
However, to achieve this success, Boston gave up the
core of pure homesteading. To get properties out under the
homesteading program, Boston reduced the sweat equity from
its original heavy requirement to a simple light
requirement. The Boston program now expects the
homesteaders to carry out only light cosmetic work on their
properties. All of the heavy rehabilitation work such as
heavy interior and exterior construction, carpentry,
interior systems, is completed by contractors. The non-
profit community development corporation makes all the
decisions and designs all of the plans for the
rehabilitation. The homesteader plays no role in
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determining these aspects of his housing. He must accept
the almost finished product presented to him. He retains no
autonomy.
With Boston's type of sweat equity, the homesteader
loses any independence he might have in determining the
shape of his housing through deciding on and performing the
rehabilitation himself. He also loses the opportunity to
renovate the house more cheaply. With Boston's model, the
non-profit chooses the rehabilitation work to be done and
hires an outside contractor to complete the project. The
homesteader pays the price for this work in the sales price
he pays to the non-profit. He must pay for whatever work
the non-profit feels should be done. He cannot leave out
things he might not really want. Also, the homesteader, in
paying the cost of the renovation, also pays the fee for the
contractor. With the freedom to make rehabilitation choices
independently, the homesteader can perform the
rehabilitation more cheaply by doing it himself.
Boston claimed that it had to make the change in self-
help in order to produce properties under the homesteading
program for lower income families. Staff cited reasons of
lack of ability and enthusiasm on the part of the
homesteaders in addition to the large size of Boston houses
as reasons why the sweat equity did not work.
However, it becomes clear that these reasons do not in
fact prevent a homesteading program from operating with a
real self-help element. The SWAP homesteading program
demonstrates quite clearly the possibility of renovating a
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large number of homes using self-help with equally
inexperienced homesteaders and equally large frame houses.
In fact, SWAP represents a perfect example of the HUD model
of homeownership for "needy" homesteaders.(64) It serves
lower income families. The families have no special skills
but they are willing and able to perform most of the
rehabilitation themselves to offset the costs of the
project.
Also in the HUD "needy" model appears the qualification
that the number of properties should be maximized and the
rehabilitation costs should be low. SWAP achieved both of
these qualifications. It has turned over 400 properties
throughout its ten year program. As well, the flexibility
and the independent nature of the renovation requirements
keeps the costs of rehabilitating each unit as low as
possible.
Most importantly, SWAP encourages self-help by
providing technical and emotional assistance through
rehabilitation classes, a Tool Bank, counseling and
assistance in obtaining mortgage financing. Even with its
limited budget, SWAP manages to subsidize the initial
rehabilitation costs. With this support system and the
independence allowed a grassroots non-profit organization,
SWAP becomes a program which effectively turns abandoned
properties into affordable homwownership opportunites for
lower income buyers.
Given what SWAP and Boston have to offer, what
elements are required to design a workable homesteading
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program? In sum, a homesteading program should be
community-based, function soley as a homesteading operation,
and be well funded by the City.
The comparison between Boston's program and SWAP
reveals the importance of a close relationship between the
homesteading organization and the homesteaders. A program
solely devoted to homesteading and operating at the
community level seems the most effective way to set up the
support systems necessary to permit a true self-help program
to work. Without autonomy on the part of both the
organization and the homesteaders, a self-help homesteading
program falters.
The other crucial ingredient is funding. To keep the
program serving low-moderate income residents, the
homesteading program must subsidize the cost of
rehabilitation. And for a community-based organization to
be able to do this, it requires government support. This
presents a difficulty in a time when a conservative federal
government plans to cut out the few remaining funds to the
nation's cities. If government subsidy is no longer
possible, serving lower income residents under a
homesteading program will no longer be possible.
Therefore, for homesteading to continue, cities must
find new channels through which to generate more funds. The
rest of community development is currently moving towards
encouraging private sector contribution in the local economy
and in local development projects. With so many millions of
dollars in the hands of banks and big business, they
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represent a crucial funding source and they stand for the
future of development funding.
Another crucial source for homesteading still exists in
cities: properties available for homesteading. While
the source of abandoned HUD properties dried up long ago,
the stock of abadonned properties in American cities is far
from depleted. Many cities still have a burdensome supply
of vacant, abandoned buildings, both City-owned and
privately owned.
What then is the future of homesteading as a affordable
housing tool in a nation with a serious housing shortage? I
do not see homesteading as the final and only answer for
affordable housing. Neither do I question the importance of
any other programs which provide opportunities for less-
than-market-rate housing. However, I do think sweat equity
urban homesteading can go beyond the basic supplying of
affordable housing to contribute the added elements of
independence and economy. As such, I think homesteading is
still a viable and important option for housing policy
makers to explore.
Self-help homesteading represents a dual-pronged
policy, and as such offers an important contribution to
housing and community development policy. First, it brings
opportunity for affordable homeownership to low and moderate
income individuals. In this it is a housing policy.
Further, and what makes homesteading with sweat equity
unique as a housing program, is that it also becomes a
community development policy. The residents of poor,
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distressed communities suffer from powerlessness to change
their situation. Many programs designed to aid the poor
hand down solutions without taking ideas and personal
involvement from the people for whom the policies are
designed. Housing programs dispense Section 8 certificates,
public housing, rent vouchers. Employment training programs
bring opportunities to learn skills, but fail to provide day
care and counseling to help families to adjust. These
remedies attack part of the problem, but they do not give a
sense of involvement and control to the poor. Planning for
the poor instead is done on their behalf by someone on the
outside.
Self-help homesteading gives back some of the power to
lower income people. It gives independence in housing
choice.' Instead of a planner deciding under what
circumstances a person should live, an urban homesteader
decides himself. Homesteading empowers rather than
controls and dominates. It gives dignity rather than taking
it away. Empowering some of the residents helps to empower
the community. Strengthening community residents helps the
whole community to grow from within.
Homesteading is not the only key to empowerment. Other
housing programs and economic development programs are
needed to truly renew failing and distressed neighborhoods.
Grassroots efforts still need the financial commitment of
the national and local governments to carry out their
plans. But as long as homesteading can be used to provide
both affordable homeownership opportunitities and bring
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autonomy and power to provision of low to moderate income
housing, it should play a role in community development
policy.
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